PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO COURT’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND
REQUEST FOR HEARING
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs have not filed a writ of Habeas Corpus. The lawsuit filed by
Mr. Peltier and Mr. Kahl seeks, among other things, monetary damages for
past and present injuries for executive action committed in violation of
Congress’ express mandate and the United States Constitution. Significantly,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in an en
banc decision, expressly concluded that suits seeking monetary damages are
excluded from the habeas analysis entirely.
Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F. 2d 804, 810n. 5 and 6, 816-17 (D.C.
Circuit 1988)
(habeas analysis “has no bearing on prisoner’s claims for money damages”
and the court’s “analysis goes solely to situations where the federal
prisoner is seeking non-monetary redress for alleged violations of
federally secured rights going to the lawfulness of his or her custody.”)
In fact, the majority opinion expressly agreed with the concurring opinion
on this point. 864 F.2d at 816-17, quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 55
(1974) (emphasizing that in damages
cases habeas is “not appropriate or available”
and injunctive
relief is proper in such suits.)
The essence of the complaint concerns a series of actions taken over the
course of many years by various bureaucrats within various branches of the
Parole Commission, the Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Prisons
which has led to the unconstitutional application of an unambiguous
statute, contrary to Congress’ express mandate, and which has resulted in
the illegal incarceration of numerous federal prisoners. Plaintiffs also
seek declaratory
and injunctive relief to enjoin the unconstitutional conduct of Defendants
who have harmed numerous federal prisoners over many years by knowingly
violating unambiguous statutes and mandates of Congress. In accord with
prior Court decisions, Plaintiffs have concurrently filed a motion for
bail pending final resolution of the suit.
Courts have long recognized that federal prisoners are not restricted to
Habeas Corpus actions and
can seek declaratory and/or injunctive
relief to remedy their being subjected
to unlawful and unconstitutional behavior by the Defendants’
unconstitutional enforcement of statutes in circumstances such as these.
Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F.2d 238, 243 (3rd
1974); Greenfield v. Scafati,
277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 713 (1968). See
also Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518 (M.D.La. 2003).
Thus, for the reasons set forth more fully below, this
case is properly before this Court and should proceed
forthwith.
FACTS
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act
(“SRA”), arguably the first comprehensive sentencing
law reform for the federal system. (S. Rep. 98-225, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3220).
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
(hereinafter “CCCA”), constituted several chapters
within the SRA and represented the decade long
efforts by Congress to create a sentencing structure that would eliminate
disparity in sentencing, establish certainty as to
release from confinement, and abolish the Parole
Commission and parole. The Senate Report noted:
At present, the concepts of indeterminate sentencing and parole release
depend for their justification exclusively upon this model of ‘coercive’
rehabilitation. . . Recent studies suggest that this approach has failed.
Most sentencing judges, as well as the Parole Commission, agree that the
rehabilitation model is not an appropriate basis for sentencing decisions.
(S. Rep. 98-225 at 3221, 3223.) The Senate Report continued:
The efforts of the Parole Commission
to alleviate this disparity unfortunately contributed to a second grave
defect of present law: no one is ever certain how much time a particular
offender will serve if he is sentenced to prison ... Thus, prisoners often
do not really know how long they will spend in prison until the very day
they are released. The result is that the existing Federal system lacks
the sureness that criminal justice must provide if it is to retain the
confidence of American society and if it is to be an effective deterrent
against crime.
Id. at 3232-3233. The Senate Report concluded:
The shameful disparity in criminal
sentences is a major flaw in the existing criminal justice system, and
makes it clear, that the system is ripe for reform. Correcting our
arbitrary and capricious method of sentencing will not be a panacea for
all of the problems which confront the administration of criminal justice,
but it will constitute a significant step forward.
The bill, as reported, meets the critical
challenge of sentencing reform. The bill’s sweeping provisions are
designed to structure judicial sentencing discretion, eliminate
indeterminate sentencing, phase-out parole release, and make criminal
sentencing fairer and more certain.
Id. at 3248 (emphasis added).
To address these issues, Congress enacted Section 235(b)(3), effective
October 12, 1984, Lyons v. Mendez, 303 F.3d at 289, which mandated
that “the Parole Commission shall set a release date consistent with the
applicable parole guideline” for those remaining in its custody “prior to
the expiration of the five years,” at which point the Commission would be
dissolved. Congress retained the Commission for five years following the
effective date of the Act solely “to set release dates for prisoners
sentenced before that date” emphasizing that by “the end of that period,
the Parole Commission would set final release dates for all prisoners
still in its jurisdiction.” Senate Report No. 98-225, 98th
Congress, First Session, September 12, 1983, p. 56 n.82.
In enacting Section 235(b)(3), Congress thereby recognized the inherent
arbitrariness underlying parole decisions. As the United States Supreme
Court recognized in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366
(1989):
It is observed that the
indeterminate-sentencing system had “unjustified” and “shameful”
consequences. The first was the great variation among sentences imposed by
different judges upon similarly situated offenders. The second was the
uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in prison.
On December 7, 1987, over three years later, Congress
amended Section 235(b)(3) to repeal the release criteria and to restore
the criteria under 18 U.S.C. 4206, Public Law 100-182,§2. Because this
amendment substantially changed existing law, Congress explicitly provided
under the “General Effective Date” of the act at section 26: “The
amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to offenses committed
after the enactment of this Act.” 101 Stat. 1272 (Emphasis
added.)
Based on the original version of Section 235(b)(3)
which became effective October
12, 1984, the Commission was abolished as of midnight on October 11, 1989,
and prisoners, such as the Plaintiffs, would have each possessed
release dates and would have, in fact, been
released long ago.
ARGUMENT
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CASE LAW
ESTABLISHES THAT THIS CASE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
The instant case is properly before this Court. The Amended Complaint
seeks damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief concerning
Defendants’ unconstitutional application of Section 235(b)(3), contrary to
Congress’ express mandate. Defendants have ignored Congress’ mandate that
Section 235(b)(3) applies to prisoners such as Mr. Peltier and Mr. Kahl
and, in doing so, have violated the ex post facto, bill of attainder, and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have
brought an action directly under these provisions of the United States
Constitution to seek enforcement against Defendants’ wrongful conduct
which has spanned many years and involves the actions of numerous
Commissioners, United States Attorney Generals, and Directors of the
Bureau of Prisons. Put simply, it is an action brought directly under
provisions of the United States Constitution which action seeks
enforcement of Congress’ express mandate and has wide ranging effect upon
the rights of numerous federal prisoners.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief that Defendants have wrongfully applied
Public Law 100-182, Section 2, enacted on December 7, 1987, and that the
rights created by the original Section 235(b)(3) must be enforced, nunc
pro tunc. They also specifically seek damages and injunctive relief
prohibiting Defendants from applying the Public Law 100-182, Section 2,
enacted on December 7, 1987. Through its equitable powers, this Court
should enforce the rights created by the original Section 235(b)(3),
nunc pro tunc, and the Plaintiffs be granted bail pending final
judgment.
Courts have made clear that Habeas Corpus is not the only remedial option
available to the Plaintiffs in these circumstances. See Geraghty,
579 F.2d at 243; Greenfield, 277 F. Supp. 644. Greenfield
and Geraghty are particularly instructive here.
In Greenfield, 277 F.Supp. 644, the Plaintiff sought an injunction
against the enforcement of a sentence under a state statute claiming it
was unconstitutional and also filed a motion for bail. The Court approved
this procedure, granted bail and ultimately ruled that the statute
violated the ex post facto provisions of the United States Constitution.
277 F.Supp. at 644-45. As such the Court issued the requested injunctive
relief. 277 F.Supp. at 646. This case was affirmed in its entirety by the
United States Supreme Court. 390 U.S. 713 (1968). This is the very same
procedure followed by the Plaintiffs herein. Since it has been approved by
the United States Supreme Court, this case is properly before this Court.
Geraghty also compels this Court to exercise jurisdiction over this
matter. In Geraghty, a federal prisoner challenged the validity of
parole guidelines utilized by the United States Parole Commission.
Contrary to the lower court’s ruling that Habeas Corpus was the only
remedy available to the prisoner, the Third Circuit ruled that the action
could properly be considered as one for declaratory judgment which was an
appropriate remedy. Geraghty, 579 F.2d at 243. In doing so, the
Court reasoned that the instant case did not raise issues of federal and
state comity:
The Courts face no
barriers resulting from federal-state
relations in adjudicating issues
such as the ones before us, since the present controversy involves the
application of a federal statute by federal
authorities. And, unlike a Habeas Corpus action challenging state
confinement, no exhaustion has been statutorily mandated. Indeed, in contrast
to the situation in Preiser, [411 U.S. 475 (1973)] Congress
expressly contemplated declaratory actions to challenge the provisions of
the federal parole guidelines.
As in Geraghty, the instant action seeks a declaration that the
Parole Commission and the remaining Defendants have illegally applied
Section 235(b)(3) as originally enacted and as amended. The complaint
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants continuing to
take illegal activities against numerous federal prisoners, such as Mr.
Peltier and Mr. Kahl. As, acknowledged by the Geraghty Court, this
relief falls within the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55(1974).
The Plaintiffs ultimately seek monetary damages for which Habeas Corpus
is not appropriate or available. Indeed, contrary to the Court’s order,
Plaintiffs are entitled to bring their damage claims under one of the very
cases
relied upon by the Court. Chatman-Bey, 864
F.2d at 810n. 5and 6, 817-18. The Chatman-Bey Court stated that
habeas analysis “has no bearing on prisoner’s claims for money damages”
and the court’s “analysis goes solely to situations where the federal
prisoner is seeking non-monetary redress for alleged violations of
federally secured rights going to the lawfulness of his or her custody.”
864 F.2d at 810n. 5and 6. See also approval of concurring
opinion on this issue at 864 F.2d 817-18. For those reasons, this
case should proceed in this Court.
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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FURTHER SUPPORT THAT THIS CASE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT.
This Court’s
reliance on Burke v. Hawk-Sawyer, 269 F.3d
1072 (D.C. Cir. 2001), is misplaced. Contrary to the Court’s rationale in
its Order, a “probalistic impact” on the duration of
custody alone
cannot supplant a civil action and compel habeas
review only, not even with respect to a section
1983 claim brought by a state prisoner in federal court.
Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 370 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(limiting holding of Chatman-Bey “to claims brought by federal
prisoners.”)
The Supreme Court’s “trilogy” of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973), Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards
v. Balistock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), all established only very limited
holdings regarding state prisoner claims under statutes enacted by
Congress which stem exclusively from the post Civil War Civil Rights and
Habeas Corpus Acts – all of which dealt with the role of federal courts
overseeing state court matters. As the Supreme Court noted, Section
1983 necessarily intersected with the habeas statute,
and the Court had to reconcile Section 1983 actions
with the requirement that “federal Habeas Corpus requires that state
prisoners first seek redress in a state forum.” 512 U.S. at 480-81.
See also Nelson v.
Campbell, 541 U.S.___, ___, 158 L.Ed.
2d 924, 932 (2004) (State prisoner claims under Section
1983 “must yield” to the habeas statute concerning review of state
prisoner confinement.)
Neither the language, history or purposes of the habeas statute confirm
jurisdiction on this Court, (cf. 28 U.S.C. §1331), nor do they
address the issues presented by the Supreme Court’s “trilogy,” which this
Court suggests confine the Plaintiffs to a single (and in this
case clearly inadequate) remedy. This is
particularly true where, as here, the United States Constitution provides
this Court with inherent jurisdiction to remedy violations such as those
presented in this
case. See e.g. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392, 396 (1971);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163-66
(1803) (citizen of United States who suffers “injury” has a “right to
resort to the laws of his country for a remedy”).
It is also significant that both the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42
U.S.C. §1983, and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, now 28 U.S.C. §2241 (C)4
and (D) and 28 U.S.C. §2254, were enacted in light of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and involved the potential clash of
sovereignty retained by the 10th Amendment. The history of those
statutes and their purposes are so well known that repeating them here is
not necessary. However, any construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
and its progeny and the federal-state comity issues arising from that Act
formed the basis for the “trilogy” of decisions by the United States
Supreme Court. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491-93.
It is also critical that 42 U.S.C. §1983 “`creates a
species of tort liability’” Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (citing
cases), whereas 28 U.S.C. §1331 grants subject
matter jurisdiction in district courts for constitutional and federal
claims. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants arise predominantly under
the express terms of federal statutes, the ex post facto, bill of
attainder and due process clauses. Plaintiffs’ right to seek redress for
injuries suffered under those clauses arise directly
under the fundamental charter of this Country itself. Bivens,
supra, United States v. Lee, 106, 196 (1882);
Marbury, supra. With respect
to Plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims, they rest on Defendants’ failure
to perform mandatory ministerial duties which Congress required of
Defendants, and they are based on Defendants’ failure to follow Congress’
command to apply the amended statute to offenses committed after December
7, 1987. Defendants, however, arbitrarily applied the 1987 amendment to
offenses committed before December 7, 1987 to the direct
injury of Plaintiffs and, of course, in direct
violation of the above noted constitutional provisions.
Even if the limited holdings of the Supreme Court “trilogy” could be
expanded to restrict
cases by federal prisoners and citizens arising directly
under the Constitution, even though Congress has never expressly attempted
to restrict theses rights, any attempt to do so would violate the
Constitution. Indeed, Plaintiffs fall directly into
the exception expressly emphasized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. Heck,
512 U.S. at 486-87, (Heck held that “the § 1983 plaintiff
must `bring his action for damages whenever he shows that his conviction
or sentence has been `reversed’, `expunged’, or even `brought into
question’ by a proper authority”).
By Public Law 9A-473, Title II, Chapter 2, effective
October 12, 1984, Congress expressly required the Parole Commission to
establish
relief dates for federal prisoners such as
Plaintiff’s “within” the respective “applicable
guidelines,” a simple ministerial task. Section
235(b)(3) mandated issuance of their
release dates within five years of October 12, 1984,
with sufficient time for federal prisoners to exhaust appeals. Section
235(b)(2)(b)(1)(F) repealed all parole statutes pertaining the Commission,
giving them a five year period to complete their ministerial duties. Sections
218 (a)(5) and 235 (b)(2)(b)(1)(A) repealed all statutory authority of the
Executive Branch to “hold” plaintiffs. Furthermore, Congress expressly
found the sentences under the pre-sentencing guideline system to be
inherently “arbitrary and
capricious.” Senate Report, No. 9A-225, page 65.
Congress’ deliberate actions more than satisfied the “reverse,” “expunged”
and/or “brought into question” exceptions of the “trilogy.” Arguably,
Congress’ declaration that the sentences were “arbitrary and
capricious” rendered them null and void and declared
that the continued deprivation of plaintiffs’ liberty indisputably
violated the Due Process clause. Consequently, the Preiser,
Heck, Edwards rulings permit the instant suit even if
plaintiffs were state prisoners proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Unlike the state prisoner plaintiffs challenging state judgments in
Preiser, Plaintiffs are not challenging any judgments by these
proceedings. They seek damages for defendants’ refusal to perform their
ministerial duties under the original 235(b)(3). Defendants have ignored
that the amended section 235(b)(3) applied to
offenses committed after December 7, 1987 and instead have applied it to
plaintiffs in violation of the ex post facto bill of attainder and due
process prohibitions, thereby
causing plaintiff’s severe injury.
Plaintiffs seek damages and request this court to exercise its inherent
power to enforce the federal statutes and constitutional prohibitions to
prevent further injury to Plaintiffs and the numerous other prisoners in
their position. Congress has granted this court full jurisdiction to
address Defendants’ wrongs and to remedy them. 28 U.S.C. §1331; 28 U.S.C.
§1657; 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202; 28 U.S.C. §1651. See United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 215 n. 19 (1980) (“`We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, then to
usurp that which is not given.’”) “But 'it is … well settled that where
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at
396, quoting, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684 (footnote
omitted.) Any constitutional “limitation” of “federal power… to citizens
of the United States the absolute right” to judicial enforcement,
federal “`courts will…adjust the remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief.’” 403 U.S. at 392, 396 (“federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”) Since this court
has full jurisdiction granted it by Congress to proceed, 28 U.S.C. §§1331,
1657, 2201-2202, 1651, the Courts should do so promptly.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have properly brought this action in this Court. Plaintiffs
are not limited to habeas as their sole remedy in the circumstances
presented. The unlawful and continued ignorance by the Defendants
regarding the unambiguous statutes has violated not only the
constitutional rights of these Plaintiffs, but numerous federal prisoners
in their same situation, and thus has entitled the Plaintiffs to pursue
the present action in this Court. Thus, Plaintiffs request that this case
proceed forthwith in this Court and that the Court schedule their motion
for a preliminary injunction and motion for bail.
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