VOLUME XXII - SUPPLEMENT
Pages 4879-4947
{4879}
MR. LOWE: I
put a piece of paper on your desk which relates to a motion, just so you
would have it before you when I made the motion. When you're ready I would
be prepared to address myself to that motion. Those are pages which are
extracted from the daily copy in this trial.
THE COURT:
Very well. You may state your motion.
MR. LOWE: Your
Honor, during the course of Wilford Draper's testimony, the questions and
answers and discourse shown in the pages which I've placed before you and
I provided to Government Counsel arose and I recite for the record that
I'm referring to the daily copy in this trial, pages 1056, 1058 through
1060, 1062, 1152A and B as the pages I'm particularly going to refer to.
Mr. Hultman
was trying to elicit from Mr. Draper testimony about a statement which I'm
sure Mr. Hultman expected would be described as having been made the night
the group was walking to Morris Wounded's house and he made some inquiries
and the witness did not give the particular answers Mr. Hultman was
expecting. He went back to refresh his recollection by a transcript of the
proceedings last year in the Cedar Rapids trial and on page 1060 Mr.
Hultman says, "Mr. Draper, in response to the question at the time in
which we have been referring, is it not a fact your response was," and
then reads the portion that has previously purported to have been given by
Mr. Draper under oath and he said at that {4880} point that he did
remember making the response. Then Mr. Hultman says, "Was that response at
that time to the best of your knowledge a true response on your part?" And
Mr. Draper said, "No."
Now there was
some additional questions asked, but in essence the witness never recanted
his statement to the best of his knowledge that was not a true response at
the time it was made.
Thereafter at
page 1152 on cross-examination at the bottom I went back and asked about
the same statement and up at the top of 1152B I pointed out in
cross-examination that it was dark and he said it was. He stated he only
knew they were generally all in a group and I said, "You mentioned that
something was said to the effect about the car and the shooting of the
agents and I ask you now whether you can first of all, whether you can
tell first of all who the statement was made by without guessing. Do you
actually know who made the statement?" He said "No." Question: "Could you
recognize the voice or were you just guessing when you said it was Leonard
Peltier?" Answer: "I was guessing." Question: "Can you tell who the
statement was made to or would you just be guessing on that?" Answer:
"Guessing."
We start with
the proposition, Your Honor, that the law is very clear that information
which is read to a witness for the purpose of refreshing his recollection
or impeaching him {4881} does not become evidence itself. It is, as a
matter of fact, a proper application when the jury is instructed. It is
not to be taken for the facts recited but is only for the purpose of
showing either a prior inconsistent statement or to refresh the witness'
recollection. That is the state of the record.
There have
been rulings or statements made by Government Counsel, rulings by the
Court in this matter which cause us concern, to be sure, everyone is
understanding the law the same way that we do. And that is that up until
this time the statements by Mr. Draper are not in evidence. That is the
first point. The only statements which was in evidence was the
corresponding questions in page 1156, basically said he didn't remember.
The statement read by Mr. Hultman from last year's transcript is not in
evidence because it was only used for a specific purpose and the witness
disavowed it. There was no proffer of any witness to testify that he
actually did testify that way. In fact, there was never a proffer into
evidence of any portion of the transcript of last year's trial as a
documentary exhibit.
So that we
believe that there is no reason to go farther than to say that there
simply is no evidence as to that statement and that that statement that
Mr. Hultman read is not in evidence.
We take it a
step farther to the extent there was {4882} even testimony that is
confusing and where he said he just didn't remember and, of course, if
Your Honor somehow feels that the statement made by Mr. Hultman at last
year's trial was in evidence, we believe that the testimony of Mr. Draper
at page 1152B in which he says first of all that he does not know who
actually made the statement, he did not know, not just does not know, he
did not know who made the statement; secondly, he did not recognize the
voice, he was guessing it was Leonard Peltier, and, third, as to whether
he could tell who the statement was made to, he was only guessing as to
that. In other words, as to the person who spoke any such statement he was
guessing and as to who might have heard it he was guessing.
This Court has
a clear obligation in such instances to strike the testimony because there
is no proper foundation and Your Honor has acquitted that responsibility
in this trial at least twice.
In the daily
copy at page 698 there was a statement made by Mr. Ecoffey in which he
said something about the Wanda Sears' house and on voir dire it was
brought out that he did not know that it was Wanda Sears' house, it was
merely guessing or repeating something he didn't know personally. Motion
to strike was made and he granted it properly.
In Mr.
Coward's testimony at page 1318, Mr. Coward was doing some guesswork about
the power of the binoculars or {4883} a scope on his rifle, I don't recall
right now which one it was. I believe the binoculars. He was obviously
speculating or guessing. Motion to strike was made and Your Honor properly
granted that. There's no question motion to strike is proper when the
witness is giving testimony which is really speculation or is based on
hearsay. What Mr. Draper has said we believe is not in evidence. With the
extent any of it may be considered in evidence, it is clearly subject to a
proper motion to strike and I move at this time on that ground.
I would ask
that the jury be instructed either one of two things: either, first, that
there is no such testimony because it was only received for a limited
purpose and is not considered testimony in this case and, second, if in
the alternative that the testimony was based on speculation and pursuant
to Your Honor's instructions to the jury already that is not permissible
and it will be struck from evidence and not considered by the jury. That
is my motion and I think I've stated it completely.
MR. HULTMAN:
Let me just respond with about three sentences, Your Honor, in light of
the fact I just now got it and, of course, one, I don't think it's timely;
two, that this seems to be the character of the record from beginning to
end that people have said something once under oath, don't recall it a
second time and, thirdly, the response I believe, if you do read it is not
as characterized by Counsel.
{4884}
I'm trying to
find the actual response by Draper and this is clearly why, again, the
jury has the opportunity to take this into consideration and his response
was, "Does that refresh your recollection," and he said "yes." "Do you
recall --
THE COURT:
Where are you at?
MR. HULTMAN:
I'm sorry. On 1059, Your Honor, page 1059.
THE COURT: I
don't have a 1059. Excuse me. I guess I maybe do. I was looking at 11.
I do have a
1059.
MR. HULTMAN:
It's the third page I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I
have found it.
You may
proceed.
MR. HULTMAN:
His answer is then, "Do you recall having been asked that question and
giving a response?" And, "Uh-huh," I assume that's yes. It's not, "Oh,
no." "Now I would ask you the same question and ask you whether or not you
can respond more fully with your recollection refreshed," and he said, "I
can't remember that much." "Well, you're saying now that you don't
remember back at the time this statement?" Answer is "Yes." "You are not
in any way saying I what you said at that time was not a correct statement
of your memory to the best of your ability at that time?" Answer: "Well,
it was something like that."
{4885}
Now this
record is also replete with testimony and questions by Counsel that your
memory is always better back then than now, is it not, and I would refer
just one of many, many, many instances. That was Brown's testimony and the
exact question to that effect and so I would respond only in that respect,
Your Honor, that, one, I think it is established to the extent and the
mere fact that then Counsel on cross comes back and makes sure his memory
isn't any better than it is now doesn't in any way destroy, one, the
testimony which he has testified on direct examination and surely the
relevancy of that testimony in no way could be questioned.
{4886}
Now, as I say,
I am not prepared in terms of any cases or anything because I just now --
but that is my total response at this time, one, that it is not timely,
but two, that it is relevant testimony; and I would object to any
instruction of that kind.
MR. LOWE: Your
Honor, may I make an observation for the record because I just observed
this? I am quite sure that the daily copy will bear me out. We have page
1060 and the next one is 1062; but the left-hand margin contains the
interim pages numbered by the court reporter, of I-9 and I-10.
I recognize
that the question on the bottom of Page 1060 corresponds to the answer at
the top of Page 1062 . Right now I can't tell if that's a misnumbering,
but it appears to be from the I-9 and I-10.
I would ask
your Honor to simply recognize that. I am quite sure that's simply a
misnumbering. We had an exchange of colloquy between counsel. If you have
it there, perhaps you could check for us.
THE COURT:
There is a 1061. That does not show up here.
MR. LOWE: I
thought that was the case when I saw the margin.
Without
repeating a whole lot of things and responding in detail, there is no
question unequivocally and without {4887} any further rehabilitation, that
Mr. Draper said what he said last summer -- the statement that he read to
him was not true to the best of his knowledge.
That
immediately means that that is a disavowal and cannot be incorporated.
THE COURT:
(Interrupting) Excuse me. May I interrupt you?
MR. HULTMAN:
It goes on two more sentences, your Honor. That is what I have been trying
to say.
THE COURT:
There is some discrepancy here. 1061 in the original transcript is
numbered 1060 here, in your copy.
MR. LOWE:
Maybe my copy was so bad it looked like 1060, and it was actually 1061.
Page 1061 starts on the top "for a side bar."
THE COURT:
1061 in the original transcript starts "for a side bar."
MR. LOWE: The
page numbers sir, very strained here.
For the
record, what I referred to previously as 1060 is actually Page 1061.
THE COURT:
That apparently 1060 was left out.
MR. LOWE: We
didn't go back that far.
THE COURT: You
have 1059.
MR. LOWE: I
think 1060 probably had colloquy where counsel started which wasn't
relevant to what I was trying {4888} to show in testimony. I know there
were some pages I did not put in there because they simply weren't
relevant to what I was trying to raise.
In any event,
he specifically says, "No, it is not true." At no point in the sentences
following there does he change his statement that that was not true.
MR. HULTMAN:
Well, I disagree, your Honor.
On Page 1062
his response is, "I can't remember", not that it is not true; and the
question: "Maybe I am not communicating", and then I asked him: "Are you
saying that here and now you don't remember, is that what you are saying?"
Answer: "I remember it, but I don't remember what was really said, is what
I am trying to say."
He isn't
denying. It is only when you go back and make a straw man again, and he
now gets his memory, that we then get to that point.
So I am
saying, John, that he has said point blank here on direct examination his
basis and his reason.
I am not
denying that in response on cross he then says what you say.
THE COURT:
Well, to save time, I am not going to rule on the motions at this time.
Do you have
other motions?
MR. LOWE: Your
Honor, we would ask that your Honor {4889} give that instruction to the
jury. We think that, at least for the reason that I stated, that he was
guessing; that all that preceded that guessing must be stricken.
We would also
move for a judgment of acquittal at this point under Rule 29.
No longer is
the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the Government. It is
not taken by a rational examination of all of the evidence, taken as a
whole, as to whether it properly can be submitted to the jury.
We believe
that the failure by circumstantial evidence or otherwise to show beyond
any reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, that Leonard Peltier either shot
the two agents at close range with those three shots or any of them, or
that he actively and knowingly aided and abetted those or that person who
did, is a fatal defect in their case which would warrant it not being sent
to the jury on the grounds that there simply, as a matter of law, is
insufficient evidence on which to convict; and in the alternative, on the
basis that Mr. Taikeff mentioned at the close of the Government's case,
that because of the inflammatory nature of some of the surrounding
collateral events that the Government has allowed to bring in -- the
Milwaukee event, the State of Oregon event, the Wichita blowing up on the
highway, the Al Running Rosebud raid, {4890} the people found there, the
weapons and dynamite, and statements and everything else -- this is one of
those cases where even if your Honor doesn't find as a matter of law that
the evidence is insufficient, you should find that given the evidence and
the state of the evidence that the prejudice and the danger of submitting
it to the jury makes it a case where in your discretion you take it away
from the jury in any event.
For those
reasons we would ask for a judgment of acquittal.
MR. HULTMAN:
The Government just resists it, your Honor, for the record.
THE COURT: The
motion for judgment of acquittal is denied.
Are there any
other motions?
MR. LOWE: One
other.
Because we
feel at this point in trial -- I say this with all respect for the Court
and in great sincerity -- that your Honor may now realize that some of the
important evidentiary rulings made earlier in this case -- and all of us
have 20-20 hindsight -- you may now realize some of those were erroneous
and cannot be cured -- the witnesses are now long gone, the jury has heard
the evidence, perhaps some of it damaging -- we believe that under the
state of the record your Honor should grant a mistrial and {4891} order a
new trial, and we so move at this time.
MR. HULTMAN:
The Government just resists again, your Honor.
THE COURT: The
motion is denied.
MR. LOWE: I
yield to Mr. Engelstein.
Your Honor,
may I ask that the pages of Mr. Draper's transcript that I handed you may
be marked, that I gave you, as an exhibit. I don't know whether it will be
an exhibit, or it will be simply filed with the papers, the supporting
documents. I don't know whether all the daily copy would become a part of
the record by reference and incorporation.
I would ask
the Court to consider them as part of the record.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
I don't know about your Honor, but I feel like I am on the twenty-fifth
mile of a marathon. I hope I can make it over the finish line.
THE COURT:
Excuse me one minute.
I have
retained -- the Clerk is looking at me critically -- I have retained a
copy of the excerpts from the transcript which you have offered along with
your motion, and that will become a part of the record.
MR. LOWE:
Thank you.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Your Honor, the defense has submitted 28 proposed instructions to the
jury, four summary {4892} instructions.
THE COURT:
Before we get into that matter, I want to say a word or two about my
procedure in instructions for counsel for both sides.
I guess the
only one that would probably be familiar with it is Mr. Crooks; but first
of all, with reference to the argument tomorrow, I will preface this with
a statement that counsel will receive a copy of the court's instructions
prior to making argument.
However, I do
not permit direct quotes from the instructions in counsels' arguments. The
reason for that is that the jury must receive all of the instructions on
the law at the same time and must receive it from the Court.
I have no
objection to counsel arguing the law as to what they believe it will be,
but I do not permit direct quotations, and the same thing will be true on
the daily copy.
I will not
permit direct quotations from any part of the transcript in the arguments.
You may argue what you believe the evidence was, but the jury must make
their determination based on their own recollection; and if we get into
the matter of counsel for either or both sides starting to quote directly
from the transcript, we are going to have a situation where undue emphasis
may be {4893} given to part of the transcript; and then counsel for the
other side will feel that it is necessary to read an additional part, and
it would not provide for an orderly procedure.
{4894}
THE COURT:
Furthermore on instructions my usual procedure is to take the requested
instructions, prepare, give consideration to requested instructions from
both sides, prepare the instructions and then furnish counsel with a copy
of the Court's proposed instructions. And then prior to argument the jury
give counsel for both sides an opportunity to state for the record any
specific exceptions that they have to the instructions which the Court
proposes to give.
I then give
considerations to those exceptions and may or may not revise what I had
intended to give. I am taking one additional step here because of the
request from defense counsel in permitting counsel from both sides to make
an argument on the instructions, and I would hope that you will limit your
argument to those areas which you feel are particularly important,
particularly critical and that should be called to the Court's attention.
Then I would
propose before counsel leave this building tonight to have a copy of my
proposed instructions ready for them so that they may take it home with
them overnight. Now, I don't know what time that will be, but it would
probably be within an hour after we have the, I have the discussion here
in court.
MR. LOWE:
Could Your Honor simply leave a copy with the marshals? We've done that on
daily copy. It's worked out very well. The federal protective service
downstairs and we {4895} can come back and pick it up.
THE COURT: If
you want it that way, I just want to make it available to counsel so that
you have the opportunity to consider it overnight and to be in a position
to state your exceptions and also to whatever effect it might have on your
argument.
MR. LOWE:
Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: All
right, Now, Mr. Engelstein, with that out of the way you may proceed.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Well, Your Honor has successfully cut off two-thirds of the remarks I was
going to make which I think everybody will be happy about. I hope not for
substance, but from the point of time. The other discouraging thing about
Your Honor's remarks is the fact that usually it is difficult enough in
oral argument to have the conviction that one is going to persuade the
Judge of the power and the force and the compelling force of one's
argument. Under the circumstances when I'm arguing against the federal
complex and the instructions are already being printed I would expect that
anything I have to say would not affect anything in the mechanics of the
printing machine.
THE COURT: In
the first place I might tell you they're not printed. And secondly, I do
give consideration to exceptions and certainly will give consideration to
arguments or I wouldn't have allowed --
{4896}
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
I understand that you are not allowing that as a vain exercise. On the
other hand I would like therefore to repeat -- I assume Your Honor has
read our memorandum. We've taken a lot of care with it. We think that
after an extraordinary trial of this nature, and I think it's been an
extraordinary trial by any standard in terms of its length, in terms of
the kind of care Your Honor has given to all kinds of aspects of the trial
starting with the number of appointments, I would say rather unbelievable
and extraordinary forebearen excessive legal argument to make sure that
all aspects of the trial have been employed properly. It would be
unfortunate if probably one of the most important aspects of a trial,
namely the charge to the jury, should, because of time or whatever, be
given a rather ordinary and mechanical treatment. It's pretty clear that
this jury after five weeks has been inundated with a vast complexity of
guns, pistols, photographs, casings, data, bits and pieces of all kinds of
things and they need a framework within which to organize the evidence. A
legal standard to which they can adapt the evidence and come to a
conclusion.
These remarks,
I only state them by way of introduction to the basic aspect of jury
charge which disturbs us a great deal from having read the Government's
proposed charges, Which is a basic failure to communicate with the jury. I
{4897} don't intend to go into every instruction, obviously. But by way of
illustration what worries us very much is the kind of instruction which
states a principle of law. The principle of law is correct. But I submit
to Your Honor as with respect to Instruction No. 9 in considering the
lateness of the hour I think it's worthwhile perhaps being amused by a
little bit. If you would look at Instruction No. 9 of the Government's
recommended instructions, it consists of one paragraph having one sentence
which is seven typewritten lines long and I submit to Your Honor that
after I read it five times in a row I wasn't sure that I knew the meaning
of it.
This is the
kind of legal language that in a sense casts discredit upon our profession
and should be avoided even though it is from Devitt and Blackman. And once
I did figure out the meaning of that instruction. It turns out that the
legal principle involved where somebody who commits the crime is doing
essentially in, as a course of habit of life, like somebody who puts a
bomb in a package and a letterman, postman delivered it is entirely
irrelevant to the facts of our trial. I cite this not because it is so
important, it would be another paragraph that would be read to the jury.
There would be another paragraph that the jury would not understand at all
But there are many such paragraphs in the Government's instructions which
state principles {4898} of law which are correct in themselves, which have
all kinds of terms such as willful and unlawful and malicious and so on
which upon examination have no relevance to this case.
I hope Your
Honor in his consideration and his conclusions with respect to submitted
charges has taken that central point into consideration. For example,
there is a charge, and that is Government charge number 19, which is a
conspiracy charge. I trust Your Honor has the Government's charges before
him as I cite them. Otherwise --
THE COURT: I
have.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Which is a conspiracy charge consisting of eight full paragraphs of legal
language. Now, what is the objection? The objection is not that the
language, is that the language is not legal or that the law is incorrect.
The objection is that that's eight paragraphs of legal language which can
only mislead the jury, has no basis on the evidence in the case presented
before us, and by the implication of the Court submission of it as a
charge to the jury suggests that in some possible way the law of
conspiracy is relevant to the evidence in this case.
It's that kind
of thing that characterizes the Government's instructions throughout which
I hope Your Honor has taken consideration of when he has come to his final
conclusion.
There was
something rather casual and mechanical about {4899} the Government's
submission because I cannot understand the rather extraordinary submission
which is their submission number 21; which, if Your Honor will turn to it,
you will discover it is either an audacious and perhaps creative attempt
to change all of criminal law or an indication of the fact that somebody
was told to type automatically some portions from Devitt and Blackman. It
is not believable that the Government would submit a proposal which says
after defining the difference between real evidence and circumstantial
evidence that the jury should come to a conclusion based upon the
preponderance of the evidence standard. Surely that's obvious to
everybody. And Mr. Crooks obliges.
MR. CROOKS:
Conceded.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
But what is even charming about this error, I like to think it's
inadvertence on the part of the Government, but they also go further and
they submit Instruction No. 23 which we adopt, which states the proper
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt which adds up to a composite of two
instructions, 21 which says the standard is the preponderance of evidence
--
MR. CROOKS:
Your Honor, perhaps to, not to interrupt counsel, but we will stipulate
that 21 should be withdrawn. Point is conceded that it is a duplication of
23. Should not be considered.
THE COURT: I
was looking at my own notes and I had {4900} already.
MR. CROOKS: I
assumed --
THE COURT:
That it had already been eliminated.
MR. CROOKS:
The only one I can blame this one on is Bruce Boyd who is not here, Your
Honor.
MR. ENGLESTEIN:
I was just going to wonder if the Government expected in addition to the
burdens of the jury that they should be trying to decide the case both on
the preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt at the
same time thereby defying Aristotle's law of the excluded mill which you
cannot do A and not A at the same time. Well, we'll accept the
stipulation, however ungenerous since it's so obvious. But that's kind of
a humorous remark due to the latest of the hour. What is seriously --
THE COURT:
Lateness of the hour is a good reason for cutting all of that irrelevant
remarks.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Your Honor, if you'll forgive me, a little candor there has to be
something in this for me.
THE COURT:
I'll allow that one.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
When I realize I'm speaking after the instructions have been written at
the midnight hour in the fourth day and the fifth week of a trial I
thought I would indulge myself. However, I would like to get back to two
main things that I consider really --
THE COURT: I
was wondering when you were going to {4901} come to those two.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Well, if you enjoy a state of wonder I have a few other remarks I can make
by the way.
{4902}
I don't want
to get very serious.
THE COURT:
Very well.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
What I consider to be instructions upon which the conviction, the
conviction or the acquittal of this defendant will turn, and I do speak
now in utter seriousness, and that has to do with the government's request
for the submission of the lesser included offenses under murder one.
THE COURT:
This is one reason that I suggested that Counsel have argument because I
realize that that's --
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
I want to speak at some length about that and some length about the aiding
and abetting charges because I believe if Your Honor does not accept our
position, given the unique nature of this case having to do with a native
American, having to do with a murder of two FBI agents, having to do with
the enormous circumstantiality of the evidence, having to do with all the
motion that has been generated and has to be generated due to the cultural
differences, the history of the country and so on, any charge carrying the
weight of the authority of Your Honor to the jury suggesting that a murder
two or a manslaughter or an aiding and abetting charge of a certain type
is proper will inevitably, since there is no inevitability in life, will
be an enormous probability lead to a compromise verdict.
I'd like to
support that conclusion with some analysis.
{4903}
The trouble
with cutting one's speech short, one has to jump through one's notes. As
every author knows how painful that is.
From the very
beginning of this trial it has been the government's assertion, which we
have accepted, in fact we enforced emphatically wherever appropriate, and
I believe Your Honor has thought on some occasions were not so
appropriate. This has been a single issue trial. There has never been any
quarrel on our side and there has never been any other assertion on the
government's side that this was not a brutal premeditated murder of two
people, in a word. Without going on, in light of Your Honor's injunction
to be brief, I don't want to indulge in any rhetoric.
There has
never been a question of the nature of I the crime. There has only been a
question of the identity of the criminal who committed the premeditated
act of murder, not was it a premeditated act of murder.
I refer Your
Honor again, I remind Your Honor of the government's Motion in Limine on
page 2, there were two or three sentences which describe with graphic
detail the close range execution of Special Agent Williams and Coler.
The Indictment
speaks of premedicated murder with malice aforethought. A great deal of
evidence has been admitted based on almost the tacit assumption that was
the nature of the crime. A great deal of evidence has been excluded {4904}
on the grounds that since this was a single act of murder at close range
of murder in the first degree, so much of the so-called political aspects
of the trial, so much of the so-called background, so much of the
so-called evidence that would have gone in to indicate a possibility of
defense of self-defense was considered not relevant so the government was
in the position of having a theory of the case to start with, a theory of
premeditated murder at close range of both people. On that position they
argued and prevailed in some cases to exclude, to exclude evidence and to
include evidence in favor of their theory.
Now when we
come to the end of the trial and we have the burden of instructing the
jury what crime was committed that day, the government now wants the
advantages of all the other possible crimes that could have been
committed, murder two and manslaughter.
Now it is very
subtle law, as our memo has shown, and we recite cases, especially in the
eighth circuit, it is very subtle law -- I withdraw the remark about the
eighth circuit. That has to do with aiding and abetting. It is generally
subtle law that the Court must not submit a charge to the jury when there
is no evidence to support a conviction on that charge. It is not a
question here of throwing all the evidence at the jury, throwing all the
possible lesser included offenses at the jury and say, "Jury, you are the
fact {4905} finder, see if there are facts in the evidence that correspond
to these crimes."
Your Honor, I
submit that there are two levels of fact finding in a case of this type.
The first level of fact finding is the jury's function. They look at all
the evidence and they find the facts and even finding the facts is a kind
of a misnomer because they are not looking for things that are loose, as
it were. What they are really determining is whether certain facts are
true. They are weighing the facts, they are determining what happened that
day and that's the sense in which they find the facts. They are not
supposed to generate facts, they are not supposed to find facts that do
not exist because perhaps they would fill holes in the evidence. They only
find the facts that are there, weigh them, assess them and come to a
conclusion what really happened that day and then match it to the charges.
Now the Court,
the judge has to find its own facts, so to speak, although they are not
really facts. Just as the facts the jury looks for supports their verdict,
the Court's obligation is to find the evidence that supports the charge.
Now there is
no evidence in this case, and there is a Supreme Court opinion which cites
in Sandstone vs. U.S. precisely on the question of lesser offenses and
greater offenses. That Supreme Court opinion states that unless that
element of greater offense in our case, the element of premeditation
{4906} which distinguishes the greater offense of murder one from the
offense of murder two and manslaughter, unless the element of
premeditation which distinguishes murder is in dispute, is in issue, then
charges for the lesser included offenses do not lie.
There has to
be evidence with respect to the law. I put it to you, Your Honor. Let's
assume it's the boy who apparently included proposal number 21 on a
preponderance of the evidence. Let's say Mr. Boy also inadvertently, I
suggest to you the charge of kidnapping and had eight paragraphs
describing all the elements of the crime of kidnapping and the statement
of the law of kidnapping would be accurate. I give this absurd example
because clearly Your Honor would throw that out since there is no evidence
in this case with respect to kidnapping.
Now to take a
closer example, what if they charged assault with a deadly weapon. Now
perhaps one could plausibly say, "Yes, there might have been an assault
with a deadly weapon but there has been no evidence in this case with
respect to that."
I conclude
with the fact that since there is no evidence supporting the fact that
there has been no premeditation in this case, you cannot charge, Your
Honor cannot charge a second degree murder and manslaughter. It goes
without saying. There is no assertion that the heat of passion overcame
{4907} malice in this case.
THE COURT: Let
me ask you this question: How do you reconcile your position on lesser
included offense with your request for an instruction on self-defense?
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Your Honor will note that in the memorandum, the instruction for
self-defense, and in this respect we parallel the government, the case has
never been clear with respect to the theory, as Your Honor knows, for the
simple reason that the government in its search for conviction, I'm sorry
to say, has left the door open for two possibilities. On the one hand they
want the premeditated murder of two people, on the other hand they talk
about shooting from a distance and all other kinds of things which might
go to support the charge of aiding and abetting. Now if the aiding and
abetting is going to come to the primary focus of the jury, then certainly
justifications of self-defense with respect to that become very
appropriate and I surmise, if I understood Your Honor, whom I listened to
very carefully throughout the trial, I surmise the reason, I may be wrong,
but the reason you didn't let a fair amount of evidence come into this
trial with respect to the climate of fear, political backgrounds
animosities between groups and so on, all of which would add up to the
clarification of what the theory of self-defense would have been was
precisely for the purpose of getting into evidence the counterbalancing
{4908} considerations in light of an aiding and abetting charge from the
shooting from a distance.
We don't urge
a charge of self-defense. We say there is only one issue here and that's
the premeditated crime and nobody says there was self-defense down there.
THE COURT: Is
it your position that the Court should instruct the jury that Counsel are
agreed that the offense that is charged in the Indictment is premeditated
murder?
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Absolutely, unqualifiedly we urge that. The government deserves that. It's
in the Indictment. It was the only reason that they were able to get
Leonard Peltier back from Canada. It was the crime that was stated in the
Warrant. It was the crime that was adjudicated. Adjudicated is not the
right word. It was the crime that was heard to present the prima-facie
case of first degree murder in Canada. From the very moment that Leonard
Peltier was picked up it has been first degree murder on every judicial
level on every proceeding.
Now we come to
the end, we come to the end and we have the door open. Why? I'd like to
cite something else for Your Honor's consideration on second degree murder
and manslaughter. That is what happened in the Butler, Robideau case last
year.
I submit to
Your Honor that one must reflect upon the Government's failure to cite the
instructions of Judge {4909} McMannus in that case. As Your Honor knows
from our memorandum we have extensive quotations from those instructions.
{4910}
Isn't it
astonishing? Same circumstances, same crimes same event, different
Defendant to be sure, different slant of the evidence because of the
different Defendant, a six weeks' trial. A Senior Judge in this Circuit
having listened to six weeks and comes up with very extensive, and I must
say in some respects very sensitive and uniquely tailored instructions,
depending upon the evidence.
You know, your
Honor, it is easy to take Devitt and Blackmur and give it to a secretary
and say, "Type up those 16 instructions," Devitt and Blackmur is like
going out and saying, "Get me a suit of clothes," and you get an average
size suit of clothes, like for an average person.
On the charge
which has to do with the charge of intent, which is the Government's
Charge 26, the U.S. versus Little Bear in the Eighth Circuit, that charge
has two paragraphs in it, as the Government has it.
The second
sentence of Devitt and Blackmur which is in the charge submitted to your
Honor was found unconstitutional by the Eighth Circuit which is the U.S.
versus Little Bear.
I cite that
only as an indication of the fact that Devitt and Blackmur is only a
starting point for an instruction and is not where you wind up which, of
course, {4911} is not what the Government does.
Perhaps Mr.
Boyd was too busy doing otherwise to think about what are charges
appropriate to this trial.
Another very
important example -- I realize I'm on a little digression. I hope your
Honor will bear with me, because if you compare our Instruction 16 with
the Government's Instruction 18 on the question of accomplice testimony,
you will see the following striking thing:
The
Government's instruction taken straight from Devitt and Blackmur says that
uncorroborated testimony -- I am summarizing -- may convict a Defendant
but must be taken with caution and should be resolved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
But the U.S.
Supreme Court on two other cases has said that is not enough in recent
years. They say -- and we submit this in our charge -- that the testimony
of an accomplice going to the innocence of the Defendant need not be
believed beyond a reasonable doubt. Note that distinction. If an
accomplice said the Defendant is guilty, you need beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Now, if that
is all that is stated to the jury, how is the jury to weigh the evidence
of an accomplice which goes to the innocence of the Defendant?
The Government
proposal doesn't tell your Honor. Our proposal tells your Honor, and our
proposal tells your {4912} Honor -- we get that text from the case law,
not from Devitt and Blackmur -- that is the difference between the
Government's instructions and ours. We have tried to include Devitt and
Blackmur, case law and Judge McManus which brings me back to what was the
starting point of this digression.
I wanted to
get those points in anyway. Before I had decided I would exclude them. I
am glad I got them in.
I would like
to take the accomplice testimony in light of what I just said. Judge
McManus in the last trial was asked to charge all the lesser included
offenses as well. He did not charge manslaughter. He did charge murder
two, and I think it is instructive to examine what must have been in the
Judge's thinking and what the circumstances were which supported his
conclusion in that respect.
Manslaughter
was clearly not in the case, and the Government's submission of
manslaughter to you as an alternative is perhaps a businessman's way of
negotiation which gives your Honor three charges so you can knock out one
in our favor and give them one in their favor.
If that's the
approach to the charges, that has nothing to do with the conscientious
concern for justice being done.
{4913}
In Judge
McManus' trial there was no single theory of the crime, that is to say,
there was no theory that both agents were killed at close range. The
theory was that one agent -- I think it is Williams -- was killed at close
range, and Coler was killed from a distance.
Therefore, the
charge of murder two is arguable, appropriate in those circumstances,
because clearly on the face of it the issue of premeditation which is
essential to the murder one charge can be in dispute with respect to the
long distance murder; and to repeat again, the Supreme Court question on
this -- statement on this, if the element which distinguishes the greater
offenses in dispute is not in dispute, we cannot charge the lesser
offense; if it is, then you may.
In our case
both are close-range murders, no dispute on premeditation, no long
distance firing. That distinguishes our case from the case last year.
I think we
should learn from Judge McManus. We don't have to follow it. We have to be
impressed that the law is very valuable.
There are many
charges of the Judge in the last trial which I think would be very
appropriate in this trial, and we have submitted many of them for your
consideration.
There is one
other consideration your Honor would be advised to ponder seriously as
possible reversibility, {4914} and that is the extradition issue. I think
your Honor has been correct in my view and in the positions he has taken
about the irrelevance of anything that happened at the extradition as
being evidence in this trial; but I don't want to go into that at the
moment. I do want to go into the basic effects of extradition law.
The United
States has an extradition treaty with Canada. That treaty specifies the
circumstances under which Canada, the asylum country, will surrender a
fugitive to the United States, the demanding country. One of those
conditions, or actually one condition with two parts, is that the fugitive
will be surrendered after a prima facie showing; and that was the kind of
showing that was held in the hearing, not an adjudication of guilt or
innocence after a prima facie showing that the crime he is being charged
with in the United States is an extraditable crime -- that's the first
half of the condition necessary for the extradition -- and the crime he
will be charged with in the United States is the crime upon which he was
extradited.
That means
that the United States cannot go to Canada and say, "We want this man on
first degree murder," and bring him here and charge him for anything else
but first degree murder.
Now, there is
perhaps a certain lack of clarity of {4915} thinking when one thinks of a
lesser included offense. It is true that as a matter of elements, murder
two and manslaughter are necessarily included offenses in murder one,
since if you have the willful killing, you have the necessary malice. If
you have the premeditation, that's the greater offense. If you have the
greater offense, inevitably you have to have the lesser offenses. They are
included in the sense they include all the elements of the offense in
stages incrementally.
It does not
follow -- in fact, it is exactly opposite to the degree of the crime.
Murder second even developed in the history of criminal law. They are just
the same crime, but have slightly different degrees. If you don't make
premeditated, you fall back in murder two. That's what you have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt is there is no premeditation in murder two. It
is not a part of murder one. If I have reasonable doubt of murder one, I
will fall back in murder two. I will get back to that.
I think the
psychological pitfall we are all in with respect to the possibility of a
compromise verdict -- because of what is involved in this case and this
whole business of lesser included offenses -- if your Honor rereads the
language of the lesser included offenses charges, and the reason of the
point of view, one, the psychology of the juror when he hears, "If you do
not {4916} feel convinced that the Defendant committed murder one, then
you may or must reconsider whether he committed murder two," and so on,
the language is so filled with the implication, sort of one thing, that
the invitation to somebody who feels there is some guilt here, there was
some crime, and by God, there has been a crime, there has been a great
social tragedy and a social disaster, naturally it is a human feeling that
somebody should pay for it, the guilty person who should pay for it. The
crime is the crime of first degree murder, no other crime.
I come back to
my extradition point. I am sorry I get a little bit worked up when I get
into this.
The
extradition issue is a matter of law. I cite the key cases in the memo,
the May case going back to 1886, and a very important case in the Second
Circuit by Judge Kaufman where he restates the principal applied to those
circumstances, and a New York case: If the United States tries a man on
any other charge that is in the warrant of extradition or any charge for
which the prima facie case for the extradition was made in the asylum
country, there is no jurisdiction in this Court.
I alert your
Honor to the fact that I believe, as an appellate issue, you risk the
jurisdiction of this Court with respect to this trial at all if you charge
the jury with any other crime than the crime for which he was {4917}
extradited.
I would like
to talk about a lot more. I will just talk about two more things. One is
the aiding and abetting.
{4918}
When I speak
of the psychological trap or pitfall of danger a compromised verdict due
to the undeniable and necessary tendency in a human being to want to come
to a conclusion, think of it. Five weeks this enormous social effort,
millions of dollars, perhaps all of this energy, twelve different people
go into the jury room, each with different sense impressions and different
degrees of conviction whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.
What drives
these people to come to their own individual conclusions, and they will be
different on things in the nature of the case. How do they come to the
unanimity? The seek for formulas under the authority of the Court which
will enable them to square their verdict with their conscience to the
degree that the Court supplies them with crimes that they can convict
against to that degree do they have more possibilities of conviction and
therefore resolve that question in their minds. That though I have
reasonable doubt about premeditated murder in the first degree I don't
have any doubt about the fact that maybe he did kill him somehow or maybe
he was an aider or abetter. After all he was present, we don't deny that.
What is being
contest is what he did that day. But two young men were killed. That's an
impressive, emotional fact and everybody wants some kind of retribution,
we know that in the history of criminal law what that's involved. Now,
{4919} I don't think your honor, after this kind of a trial that we have
had with all its square and scrupulous necessarily wants to invite a
compromised verdict. I get down more specifically and eliminate some
agitation, if I may characterize it that way, to the legal aspects of
aiding and abetting charge. I would like Your Honor to compare our charge
number 9 and our supplementary charge number 2 with the Government's three
charges of 7, 8 and 10 straight out of Devitt and Blackmun. mere was of
course nothing wrong with the law of Devitt and Blackmun. It's pretty fair
law except it has willful cooperation, general participation, very vague
language. Devitt and Blackmun was written a number of years ago. There is
a lot of law and a lot of it in the 8th Circuit and here is when I meant
to make the remark I made before which specifies with great particularity
what is involved in order to have committed the crime of aiding and
abetting. There is a parallelism between the danger of compromised verdict
on aiding and abetting on the lesser included offenses in this sense. A
juror thinks who is in doubt with respect to premeditated murder. A juror
likewise can think if he's in doubt about premeditated murder maybe he
aided and abetted, He was shooting up there from the hill, he was there,
he was in the army camp.
Now, aiding
and abetting is not helping. Helping is not aiding and abetting, and we
have enumerated and specified {4920} five very specific elements, each one
of them supported by case law. As you notice in our memo that you're now
looking on, Your Honor, which requires it seems to me the spelling out for
the jury so that they understand so there's not a verdict not based on
understanding what is meant by community of intent, what is meant by
common design, what is meant by the defendant being aware in the first
place that even if something he did did in fact aid the commission of the
crime, and this is part of our supplementary motion. He has to be aware of
the fact that what he did would have in fact facilitated the commission of
the crime, not merely that he did the act and it did in fact facilitate
the commission of the crime.
Intent after
all is what distinguishes a civilized from a barbarous criminal law. Did
he intend to participate, did he work with him, did he work with him prior
to the plan? Those are the elements of aiding and abetting that a juror
has to understand in order for their verdict, not simply to be a layman's
casual saying, well, the defendant must have been there, he must have
helped somehow. He's an aider and abetter in a colloquial sense of the
term. That is the danger to be avoided.
We have, I
don't want to read them now, it's late, although I would love to take each
element and try to explicate it in somewhat greater detail hoping Your
Honor is sensitive to the danger that Your Honor yourself would like to
avoid. {4921} Well, Your Honor, I would like to avoid that the jury not
get a false notion of what aiding and abetting means. Aiding and abetting
is a crime in its own right. It is not simply an assistance to the
principal crime.
Now, there is
one very specific and important point of law that we mentioned in our
proposal that I want to alert Your Honor to because it's a serious matter
of law. When we struck the names of the other defendants in the indictment
we had an understanding that there would be no reference to the previous
trial. There's been plenty of reference to the previous trial, but no
reference to an acquittal in the previous trial as far as I know and I've
been here almost all of the time. That agreement has been honored, But I
think we have to talk about that here because the law of aiding and
abetting says with very great specificity that if the only principals of
the crime are acquitted you cannot be an aider and abetter to that crime.
Now, I'm fully aware of the law, and if the Government intends to respond
I will save them the trouble by saying that it is not necessary for the
principals of the crime to be known if the jury feels that somebody killed
those people but they don't know who it is, then it would be not improper
if they find that all the elements of the crime of aiding and abetting are
satisfied to convict the defendant of aiding and abetting. But -- and this
is the thrust of that sentence we have in that proposal. There has been a
lot of {4922} evidence in this trial about Bob and Dino and Dino and Bob
and Butler and Robideau and ski masks and guns and a whole bunch of stuff
about Dino and Bob. They are principals in the minds of the jurors.
It would be an
error, but unhappily from the point of view how serious we are about our
justice system and an error we would never be able to discover that if the
jury came to a sincere conviction that Butler and Robideau were the people
who killed them, and only they were the people that killed them and
Leonard Peltier aided and abetted them, and as a matter of law Leonard
Peltier could not have aided and abetted them because they were acquitted
in a previous proceeding.
Therefore we
have a very straight forward, a very straight forward proposal in that
charge which simply states in a very factual matter if that is what they
come to a conclusion, and we are very careful in that language to specify
only, only Butler and Robideau are the principals, then there cannot -- a
charge of aiding and abetting cannot lie.
To go to
another area. I want to now speak of cautionary instructions. Your Honor
did admit a rather vast amount, large amount of evidence covering a vast
geological territory and covering a large period of time from Wichita to
Oregon to Canada to Milwaukee and so on. We argued the points, {4923} we
disagreed with your rulings, but they were the rulings of the court and
that's where we are. At the time Your Honor indicated that they would be
admitted for limited purpose. I would like to stress now that if we want
to get a verdict on the evidence, and I sincerely believe that is what
Your Honor is striving to get judging from everything that Your Honor has
done in this trial so far, all the immense, all the time, all the concern,
then probably the largest danger that looms before us if we want to get a
trial that is just, which means a verdict on the evidence whether the
verdict is guilty or innocent is not relevant, but a verdict on the
evidence, then we need the kind of cautionary instruction, especially in
this trial that goes far to tell the jury that this man's character is not
on trial. There's a very great sentence from Wigmore dealing with a whole,
dealing with the question of the admission of evidence of other crimes in
which he says there's a tendency in human beings to want to punish for
evil that is done. And if a juror feels that the man on trial is an evil
man or a bad man they will not be so conscience stricken about convicting
him for the crime beforehand because they will feel sure if they acquit
him he will go out and commit another crime. And that is the theory behind
the rule of admission of evidence of other crimes. And yet a great deal of
stuff has come in with respect to other alleged crimes of the defendant.
Obviously I'm not {4924} re-arguing the merits of those results. What I'm
asking Your Honor is to give great thought and almost in terms tell this
jury that they've only have one task, and only one task, not to come to a
conclusion about this man's propensity for crime based on things they have
heard, not to want to in somehow reflect retribution of society upon a
person because a horrible crime was committed. And indeed it was a
horrible crime. {4925} No justification of crime of that sort. There is
equally no justification for convicting innocent people for crimes of that
sort unless the evidence against them is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
We ask Your
Honor to read those cautionary instructions and I have no desire to put
words in Your Honor's mouth, but I would have gone further except it might
have been presumptuous to go further and speak of the fact that they are
not convicting or judging the man's character or the man's past, they are
judging the evidence of that day and the crime committed on that day.
I have more to
say but it is late. I want to conclude with a great sentence that is in
one of the charges and with all the things I have said about Devitt and
Blackmun, I now take it all back because that sentence is in one of their
charges. Needless to say, the government did not include it. The last
sentence in charge number 27 of or proposed charges, a charge also
included that Judge McMannus, says "The government always wins win justice
is done regardless of whether the verdict be guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution is not supposed to seek convictions, they are supposed to seek
justice and justice will be done if the verdict comes down on the
evidence." And the verdict will only come down on the evidence, Your
Honor, if you go through those charges and not treat them as an ordinary
run of the mill Devitt and Blackmun {4926} kind of thing, bargain basement
charges, address each element from the point of view of most recent case
law, anticipate the psychology of an average group of 12 people and how
they will respond to the complexity of these facts, the dynamics of being
a native American versus the FBI. It's inherently difficult for them to
look at the thing concretely. We must help that jury and that burden rests
upon Your Honor. I trust you will carry it off in a manner that's been
consistent with your scrupulousness and consciousness with which the trial
was conducted.
THE COURT:
With reference to that last sentence of Devitt and Blackmun you approved
of so heartily, I must advise you I revised that about three years ago and
used my revised version ever since.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
I hope it's a revision upward and not sideways.
THE COURT: I
might tell you I have revised it "If justice is done society wins whether
the verdict be guilty or not guilty."
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Well, you have been so --
THE COURT: I
am not going to give you an opportunity to argue that.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
I don't want to quibble.
The name of
the government has been used so often. It's an interesting distinction.
The government, we're all part {4927} of the government and this arm of
the government and we use the term, government can be misleading. Now I
have had my say, since I think the issues are substantially, needless to
say, as you granted all your questions based on our memorandum, I have no
objections whatsoever. But in fact, all of the issues we directed our
attention to and all our submissions of case law and whatever have in fact
not been absorbed in any reasonable amount, I would feel really distressed
at the conclusion of an incredible trial and I think it raises the
possibilities of a tanous compromise verdict to a very high level.
MR. SIKMA:
Your Honor, I wish to speak very briefly on these matters.
If what Mr.
Engelstein said was true about lesser included offenses, I think there
would hardly ever be a case where the government charges of first degree
murder, that lesser included offenses would not be charged. When the
government charges first degree murder, this includes all of the other
charges of murder and I think that his statement that in this case we had
been from the beginning charging first degree murder is not accurate.
I'm going to
speak first very briefly about the issue of extradition. The defendant was
not extradited on a charge of first degree murder, The defendant was
extradited on a {4928} charge of murder and section 1111 and 1114 provide
that anyone convicted of murder charged, that anyone who is convicted of
murder shall be punished as provided in section 1112 and 1114, or whoever
kills a federal officer shall be punished as provided under section 1111
and 1112 which would lead us to believe that if one is charged of killing
a federal agent as the defendant is charged, then this would include the
charge of manslaughter. I do not think that that would prevent the Court
from issuing an instruction in this case with regard to a lesser included
offense of manslaughter.
We are here,
as the evidence would warrant a manslaughter instruction. The law requires
that such an instruction be given. I think that it is imperative in this
case because of what the defense has been, that a lesser included
instruction be given.
I will point
out that the defendants themselves offered evidence to show that the
defendant and a number of his companions were involved in a situation
where they set themselves up as a vigilante group outside of the law to
protect certain people directly contrary to the local laws, directly
contrary to the law and if someone is killed in that process I think that
would, even if the jury didn't find that the defendant himself committed
the murder directly but found that the murders were committed as a result
of the fact that the defendant and his companions were acting in this
manner, that {4929} the jury could find that the defendant was guilty of
manslaughter and therefore by the defendant's own evidence they have
raised this question. Also by raising the question of self-defense they
have raised the issue of what the defendant's intent was with regard to
this offense. An intent is frequently or is often a matter of degree,
particularly when it comes to killing another human being.
If the
defendant was assisting someone to the degree that his mental state would
be such to fall within the manslaughter category, then that instruction
must be given, and if either party requests the instruction, the law as is
now stands requires that such an instruction be given.
With regard to
the area of aiding and abetting, I would state that aiding and abetting is
helping. Aiding and abetting is seeing to it or assisting someone in the
commission of a crime. Now even if the jury did not believe that the
defendant himself walked up to the agents and shot them from close range,
from one foot or point blank range, they could nevertheless believe beyond
a reasonable doubt under the state of the evidence that the defendant
helped the person who did and the government is not required under the law
in the eighth circuit to prove that this defendant actually pulled the
trigger if the defendant is responsible in aiding and abetting. There is
evidence to show circumstantial evidence by his contact both before and
after the offense to prove that {4930} he aided and abetted those who were
involved with him.
{4931}
I think also
that the Government has never contended that this offense was committed by
one person, and only one person was involved in the commission of this
offense.
Such an
interpretation of the evidence would be totally absurd.
While the
Defendant, we believe as the evidence shows, was directly responsible,
directly involved in the killing of these two agents, in the murder of
these agents; and that the evidence certainly would substantiate a verdict
of first degree murder, that, nevertheless, if the jury is not convinced
of that, they must be given the alternative second degree murder and
manslaughter; and in addition to this, they must be given the opportunity
to decide that the Defendant or that the agents were killed, and aided and
helped by one of these phantoms that the Defendant has been presenting
evidence about in the court.
The Defendant
has presented evidence that somebody else came in. They have been trying
to leave this impression in the mind of the jury, that some phantom came
in and committed these murders.
Well, from the
Defendant's actions, both during the time of the offense before the agents
were killed, before the agents were dead, and after the agents were dead,
it is obvious that the Defendant was helping whoever {4932} committed this
crime; and I think that's the Government's comments at this time.
Perhaps on
some of the requested instructions that the Defendants have made, Mr.
Crooks has prepared an argument on that, your Honor.
MR. CROOKS:
Your Honor, this will be very brief. The only ones that I will touch on --
most of them we have objected merely -- an objection merely to the form.
I think, as
Mr. Engelstein indicated, the case has been tried hard. However, on No. 3
counsel again raises the --
THE COURT:
(Interrupting) Whose No. 3 are you talking about?
MR. CROOKS:
Their No. 3.
They asked the
Court to instruct before the Defendant can be convicted solely on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, the jury must be satisfied that every
possibility other than killed by circumstantial evidence -- that, of
course, is a misstatement of the law.
The Holland
case, I think the Court is well aware of, Holland versus the United
States, 348 U.S. 121, Pages 139 to 140, a 1954 case, states very
specifically that that instruction is improper, it is confusing, it is an
incomplete statement of the law; and there are numerous cases which cite
-- including the United States {4933} versus Shahane, in this Circuit, 517
Fed. Second 1173, that that is not a proper statement of law; and in this
Circuit they have now apparently agreed that even the Circuit Court cannot
use it as a viewing stand.
The next
instruction which I feel deserves some special comment is their
Instruction, Request No. 6.
I do not think
the citation, Mulberry versus Wilbur, is appropriate. That case simply
held that the burden cannot be shifted to the defense upon self defense. I
do not think that is an element of the crime. This is a statement of law.
I do not think that is an element of the crime.
Self defense
is raised, and obviously under Mulberry versus Wilbur, the United States
has the same burden beyond a reasonable doubt as it does to all other
issues; but it is not an element of the crime of murder.
The next area
which I would take disagreement with counsel's legal argument is their
Paragraph No. 5 on their Instruction No. 9, the part where they talk about
Robideau and Butler: You cannot convict them if you feel that Peltier is
aiding and abetting them.
I do not
believe that is a correct statement of the law.
I would cite
to the Court, United States versus Musgrave, a Fifth Circuit case found at
483 Fed. Second {4834} 327; cert. denied, 94 Supreme Court 447; and Pigman
versus the United States, 407 Fed. Second 237, Eighth Circuit, 1969.
I do not
believe that is the decision. I believe the law, as stated at least in
this Circuit, is an acquitted co-defendant does not bar the conviction of
someone else who was aiding and abetting.
The next
instruction that I would take issue with as to the legal conclusion on is
their Instruction No. 13. This goes into what Mr. Sikma said. I do not
believe that is a correct or complete statement of the law.
Obviously,
firing from the junked cars can be considered by the jury as circumstances
to be considered in the aiding and abetting as respect to the case; and I
do not believe that it is correct to make an instruction as indicated by
counsel, that obviously it is evidence with which the jury can determine
that the Defendant was in fact aiding and abetting, and that is a
misstatement as it appears in counsel's request.
THE COURT:
What part did you state that you considered?
MR. CROOKS:
Well, I would state, your Honor, that --
THE COURT:
(Interrupting) Maybe I am on the wrong page.
MR. CROOKS:
Their Instruction No. 13.
{4935}
THE COURT: I
was looking at a different 13.
MR. CROOKS:
Their Instruction No. 13, very short: If you find as a fact that the
Defendant fired at the agents from the junked car or similar distance, you
must find the Defendant not guilty unless you also find beyond a
reasonable doubt a conscious and willful involvement in the actual
premeditation; and my objection is that that, as it appears there, is a
misstatement because of its incomplete nature.
That is
evidence which a jury can consider in determining whether or not he did
aid and abet; and to segregate it out in the fashion that counsel has
here, it becomes a misstatement by being an incomplete statement.
The other
objection which I would have specifically is with regard to No. 19. I do
not believe that that stands for the proposition of the Vold case
basically.
First of all,
there is no evidence, I don't think, of any testimony that the Government
witness has -- or the Government witness has been induced to testify
falsely.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
Could I chuckle at that?
MR. CROOKS: Go
ahead.
However, the
statement is not -- the correct statement of the law is as set forth in
Vold. I do not {4936} think this is a matter which is a correct statement
of law. Counsel has in effect said that if any witnesses testified falsely
on the Government's side, that then is the reason to doubt the entire
Government's case; and that is not a correct statement by any manner or
shape.
The correct
statement would be the general charge that any witnesses who testified
falsely may be disbelieved by the jury; and I would object to putting the
instruction in the form it is here because it is confusing and misleading.
The last item
which I would comment on, your Honor, is simply with regard to No. 25.
That is not a correct statement of the law as per Rule 801(d)(1). The
correct statement is that testimony given under oath which is used for the
purposes of impeaching and so forth is admissible as substantive evidence.
Now, that is a
change in the Rule. There is no question but that is the law under Rule
801(d), that prior inconsistent statements made under oath are admissible
as substantive evidence, and that is then specifically set out in the
Rule; and I would think in every case where the witness has admitted the
statement is made, that would apply, and it can be considered by the jury
as substantive evidence so the instruction which was requested, No. 25, it
simply a misstatement.
{4937}
That
instruction states the law as it was prior to the amendment of the Rule.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
May I respond briefly, your Honor?
THE COURT: You
may.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
I think it is unfortunate, considering the seriousness of the charges in
the record in this respect, we did not get a responsive brief from the
United States, so that we would have the occasion to ponder some of it, in
fact read some of the citations he has thrown at us, because if your Honor
will forgive me, we have some experience in the way in which the
Government uses citations.
{4938}
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
I call your attention to, I call your attention to the Government's
proposal number 24 which is a quotation from U.S. v. White whose point is
to suggest that guilt can be inferred from the act of flight. I don't know
whether Your Honor or his law clerks read this case, but I put it to you
that it is a laboratory specimen, as a laboratory specimen of selective
quotation for the purpose of misleading. I would rather put it that way
than to suggest that a failure of plain literary on the part of the
Government. If you look at that case you will discover that the conclusion
that the Government draws from the case with respect to that kind of
instruction is cited by the Judge in that case as the kind of charge that
a judge may not give. That case stands for the proposition that that
charge must not be given, but in the circumstance of that case in this
respect the Government is not entirely erroneous. It was not a cause for
reversal because under the totality of the circumstances the error in the
charge was considered harmless in consideration to the overwhelming guilt
of the defendant.
But for the
Government to cite boldly a charge citing the authority of a judge when
that judge said precisely said that charge is an improper charge, what
shall I say? And the Government now throws cases at us. We've seen the two
cases they threw at us. With respect to the point that conveniently served
as our law clerks because they supported {4939} our proposition, rather
theirs, and with respect to number 3, with respect they cited a Government
1954 case. But Your Honor, we cite three cases supporting our charge with
respect to circumstantial evidence, cases as late as 1971 and others.
I ask Your
Honor to check it out to see on whose side does the case law fall. I think
Mr. Crooks, despite his best intentions, does have a point on our proposal
number 13. And I think that a cure for that proposal, a cure for that
point would be in number 13 with respect, if you find as a fact that the
defendant fired at the agents, I think if you put in the word "only fired
at the agents" then there's an internal consistency and logic to our
proposal which makes it stand on its own feet. And this of course, this of
course does not relate to aiding and abetting charge which has its own
complexity. And Your Honor must know those aspects of any single proposal
for charge that don't quite cover the subject are covered with the other
charges within the totality of the charges. And the charges must be judged
as a whole So that even if this event occurs the defendant must be found
not guilty of the primary charge; and then if he's found to be guilty as
an aider and abetter it is not because he helped, as Mr. Sikma would have
it, assisted or something he did was helpful, but he must satisfy the
elements of a crime.
I beg of Your
Honor, aiding and abetting is not helping. {4940} Aiding and abetting is a
crime. This defendant can go to jail for life because he helped. There had
to be a principal crime. He had to have a community of intent, prior
design, a desire to help, a fact that he helped and awareness that he
helped. All of these elements have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt. Not mere helping, as Mr. Sikma would have it.
Mr. Crooks
says Vold does not stand for the proposition for which it is presented to
the Court. I don't know whether Mr. Crooks noted, I hope Your Honor noted,
that Vold stands for which we present is in quotation marks. It's been the
entire language of our language. mat sentence could not be put more
perspectively by us. It is the sentence of the Court It is the sentence of
the law and I note, and this has been a theme with respect to your honor's
rulings on evidence questions. The question of Government misconduct as
stated in that charge in Vold simply is reasonable to put before the jury
as another element for them to weigh the merits of, with respect to the
weakness of the Government's case. Because there are other elements in the
Government's case we suppose.
We would not
like to think that the Government would have brought forth a case if there
were no other elements in the case that they could prove. Mr. Sikma thinks
that the Government must be given an opportunity to do X, Y and Z. I think
Mr. Sikma wants the Government to be given the opportunity {4941} to get a
conviction. If you have the lesser included offenses in the charges you
give the jury the opportunity of convicting the defendant on six crimes:
murder one, murder two, manslaughter, aiding and abetting. Murder one,
aiding and abetting; murder two, aiding and abetting; manslaughter. Six
possible crimes with which the jury can satisfy their feeling that some
crime was committed. This man's a bad man, he must have been there
somehow. We've got six multiple choice, a multiple choice of six crimes.
That's what Mr. Sikma would like, and I understand that. It is inaccurate
as a matter of law that when the Government charges premeditated murder an
indictment automatically follows; that lesser included offenses are
chargeable. me case that we cite in our, I think it's U.S. v. Kopla is a
case in which the trial judge, Your Honor's counterpart in that case,
charged only murder in the first degree. The appeal went up on the failure
to charge the lesser included offense. The trial judge was upheld on the
ground that there was no evidence in the record, none whatsoever to
support the possibility of a conviction on the lesser offense.
The notion of
lesser offense, which means the elements of the lesser are included in a
greater, does not mean that when you charge the greater offense you
automatically charge the lesser offense. It's not a lesser charge. After
all, murder two is an enormous crime. It's not a lesser crime. {4942} It
only lacks one element of the greater offense.
Mr. Sikma,
under question of extradition, I have, and I cite in the brief the
Canadian Extradition Act. And it does happen that Mr. Sikma is not
inaccurate, but only technically. There's a schedule in the Canadian
Extradition Act and I cite that in the brief which lists the crimes which
are extraditable and within the meaning of U.S. v. Rocha, the landmark
case. The crimes therefore upon which the defendant must be charged in the
demanding country, if in fact there is an extradition, and in the schedule
there is murder which is number one, murder or attempted, or conspiracy to
murder, and number two is manslaughter. Number two is an absolutely
distinct crime and it is the kind of such an audacious disregard of what
the element is. Taken in the situation for Mr. Sikma to ask for
manslaughter, he says it's elementary law. Is Judge McManus ignorant of
elementary law that he failed to charge manslaughter in the last case
under the same circumstances? In fact, under our argue of the more
plausible circumstances, considering the theory of that case where there
was murder from a distance. Now, murder, the Canadian law as far as I
know, and I've inquired from Canadian lawyers and I'm sorry I cannot cite
this to you, they don't have a concept of murder two. They just say murder
or attempt to conspire. It is not known to us whether the Canadian
authorities, what attitude they would have taken on murder two. {4943} But
it's not for us to understand what attitude they have.
The case of
U.S. v. Stowbell on the extradition by Judge Caufman of the 2nd Circuit
cited in our brief specifies very, very exactly the need to try the
defendant on precisely the crime that is in the warrant and that is in the
indictment.
Now, Mr. Sikma
might be right. The charge in Canada may have been on him for murder, but
the charge in Canada was based on the U.S. indictment. And the U.S.
indictment is murder premeditated with malice aforethought which is murder
in the first degree. mere is a slate of handling in the argument, Your
Honor. Now, just two slight points. And that is I fail to mentioned
something rather important in my presentation. If I may indulge, although
I recognize this is rebuttal, there were five or six charges, Your Honor,
in which you are being asked to refer to evidence in the case. For example
there's a charge of, if my memory serves, about third part culpability if
they interfere with the arrest of the arrestee. That is to say if FBI
officers, if you find FBI officer who comes on the reservation to arrest
Jimmy Eagle and Leonard Peltier interferes with that then the culpability
of Jimmy Eagle will transfer itself to the culpability of Leonard Peltier.
I don't quarrel with the statement of law, that's in the first paragraph.
But for Your Honor -- by the way, there is no evidence to support that
charge to start with. That --
{4944}
THE COURT:
Which request do you have reference to?
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
That's number 30 of the Government's charge. If you read that charge, Your
Honor, you'll see the following interesting thing that the Government has
tried to do. Paragraph one states a perfectly correct statement of law.
The question is its relevance. I'm sorry, I'm continuing to talk while you
are still looking for the charge. {4945} Sorry I'm continuing to talk
while you're still looking for the charge. Charge 30 of the government.
THE COURT:
Very well.
MR. ENGELSTEIN:
The first paragraph, as Your Honor will note, is an accurate statement of
the law, no doubt. It's the second paragraph that receives the support of
the accurate statement on the first paragraph suggests a scenario for the
day. It's a theory of the case. Now that is saved as a suggested scenario
to be given the enormous weight of Your Honor's position with respect to
the jury. After all, the jury knows nothing about what Your Honor is going
to tell them. The scenario is not said to have the small words in it. If
you find that the government did such an assume of Jimmy Eagle and Leonard
Peltier, the facts there are enormously suggestive. That is true of two or
three or four of the government's proposals. Numbers 20 and 22 deal with
the duties and the jurisdiction of the FBI, that I they have a right to do
A, B, C, D and F. That's stipulated. It's known. It's not an issue in the
case. It's merely self-serving and inflammatory. That's government's
instructions 20 and 22.
Government's
instructions number 29 properly states the law of the right of the FBI to
use force, et cetera, et cetera under some circumstances. The question is
relevant. It's not at issue. Nobody can test it. They have that right.
{4946} They did it. It was not an issue in the trial. Why does it have to
be told to the jury.
Your Honor,
it's very clear the government would like Your Honor to tell it to the
jury because it tells the jury once again about the atrocity of the crime.
It is in fact the weighing of evidence which is not properly the scope of
the giving of instructions to the jury for determination of the law.
Under the
question of self-defense, I guess I can merely repeat since it was raised
by Mr. Sikma and that is a rather, I think, sticky theoretical issue in
this case. We have to straddle our responses because the government
straddles its theory. We say that iŁ somehow due to the charges of Your
Honor, due to the evidence it is Your Honor's belief that there is the
possibility of a reasonable aiding and abetting conclusion on the part of
the jury which the must come to beyond a reasonable doubt, then the I
instruction on self-defense is appropriate and I once again cite the
authority and good judgment of Judge McMannus who has the very elaborate
self-defense. In fact, it would be an irony in this case if all of the
evidence that Your Honor has in fact permitted, I don't want to stress how
much you have not allowed in, but what I do think of what Your Honor has
allowed in the case, that self-defense is relevant precisely because that
did come into the case. If it is going {4947} to be said that this
defendant did anything other than the close range premeditated act of
murder, it's in that sense that we say self-defense should be charged. We
do not urge it, we would stipulate it out of the case.
To conclude,
Your Honor, it is one crime and the question is that did this defendant do
it and I think given the nature of the jury, given what we know of human
psychology, what we know of the need for unaninimity, what we need to know
to punish, if Your Honor leaves the door open by the inclusion of multiple
crimes, confused and complicated as they must be even for a law student to
understand and lends the weight of the authority of our system of law
expressed through Your Honor, that jury will come in with a verdict of
guilty even though they believe that this defendant is innocent, not
guilty. That no evidence has been proven against this defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt for the guilt of first degree murder, for the crime of
first degree murder.
THE COURT: The
Court is in recess.
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